This essay proceeds from two assumptions: first, that “reproduction” is a persistent but insufficiently recognized concept in scholarship in the field of childhood studies, and second, that “non-reproduction” is the repository of reproduction’s negativity, which deserves its own conceptual development in the field. Both reproduction and non-reproduction are necessary concepts for childhood studies: the first must be recognized as such, rather than taken for granted, while the second must be advocated as a viable site of thought. In the pages that follow, my goal is to offer some preliminary theses on non-reproduction as a concept for opening up our thinking about childhood. These theses appear in the final section of the essay. Along the way to that concluding section, I sketch some of the ways in which reproduction and non-reproduction structure our thinking already within and beyond childhood studies. Ultimately, I suggest that we position non-reproduction not simply against but also within and beside reproduction in an effort to map new avenues of thought and new sites of inquiry for the field.

Origin Stories
The organizers of this panel invited participants to “question and interrogate familiar keywords used in the study of cultures of childhood and youth, and propose new terms and definitions to capture and understand the complexities and contradictions that define young peoples’ cultures and texts” (“Congress”). Each of us was asked to bring a familiar word that is used often in studies of youth, cultures, and texts and a new keyword that is not found in current keywords collections and that the presenter thought crucial to include. Coming from the field of queer studies (which has spent the better part of a decade debating Lee Edelman’s concept of “reproductive futurity,” a concept I will discuss shortly), I decided to suggest “reproduction” as my familiar word and “non-reproduction” as my new keyword. In the spirit of Raymond Williams’s
interest in the ways in which the “beginnings and endings” of ideas “are incorrigibly wayward” (2), I would follow the panel organizers’ advice and take an approach to “keywords in cultures of young people” that acknowledges that language is erratic and unpredictable.

My first stop on the “incorrigibly wayward” road was at the recent keyword collections that seemed most relevant to childhood studies. There, I discovered (much to my chagrin) that “reproduction” has never really been a keyword at all. Despite my conviction that the very concept of childhood was underwritten by thinking about reproduction, I was surprised to discover that “reproduction” does not make a single appearance in any of the published keyword texts. Philip Nel and Lissa Paul do not feature it in their Keywords for Children’s Literature, nor does it show up in Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler’s broader Keywords for American Cultural Studies. Williams himself did not include it in his Keywords book. I found myself foiled in my very effort to frame my intervention precisely in terms of the “keywords” books. This is not to negate the significance of “reproduction” for the field altogether—“social reproduction,” in particular, has been enormously important for many scholars in childhood studies. In fact, I began to think that perhaps this is not a keyword precisely because this term is so taken as given within a field defined by the biological results of sexual reproduction: the child.

Such, essentially, was the argument that Edelman made about the figure of the child in his 2004 polemic, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. In defining “reproductive futurism,” he argues that “[t]he fantasy subtending the images of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought” (2). He then proceeds to uncover this reproductive logic, highlighting the extent to which it preserves “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations” (2–3). The logic of reproduction, for Edelman, naturalizes and normalizes itself precisely through the figure and the fantasy of the child. No wonder it hides itself in plain sight so successfully, especially in childhood studies. Moreover, opposing this logic of “reproductive futurism,” says Edelman, is queerness. “Queerness,” he argues in one of the most frequently cited passages of his book, “names the side of those not fighting for the children, the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (11). To be clear (and this is an important caveat), Edelman insists that it is the figure of the child—the child as rhetorical device and as concept—that organizes politics, and this figure should not be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children. A queer politics for Edelman entails rejecting this logic of reproductive futurism and the child in
whose name it operates. Hence his famous diatribe: “Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from *Les Mis*; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital l’s and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop” (29). While Edelman’s argument, at the level of sentence and concept, requires great subtlety of thought, it proceeds with no such nuance in diagnosing the starkly divided sides of the political debate: there is the side of the child—the very embodiment of reproductive futurism—and there is the side of queerness, the site of resistance to that logic of reproduction.

I think Edelman is right to identify the ways in which reproduction underwrites the very logic of the social, although many scholars have voiced potent critiques of his argument. Rather than rehearse those debates about the child’s status within conservative politics as such, however, I want to suggest that we take Edelman’s own assumptions to their logical conclusion. Even in opposing the logic of reproductive futurism and the child who embodies it, is queerness not actually defined, even for Edelman, precisely in its (refused) relationship to the child? Might seeming opposites (the child and the queer, reproduction and non-reproduction) not be entangled or positioned alongside each other more complexly than they seem at first?

“The Age of Reproduction”?

In her October 2013 inaugural lecture as Cambridge University Chair of Sociology, Sarah Franklin declared ours to be “the age of reproduction,” insisting that scholars be attentive to the “reproductive turn in social thought.” Franklin recognizes that reproduction has long been both central to and insufficiently theorized within the social sciences and the natural sciences. This she terms the “reproductive paradox.” The “turn” she diagnoses nonetheless suggests that reproduction has become a newly significant object of social concern and academic inquiry that revolves around the making of babies. The child, in other words, is the very outcome of our reproductive logic, a logic we both embrace and disavow. Indeed, at a time when the rise of new technologies like IVF increasingly facilitate biological reproduction and when the “gayby” boom is in full swing, sociologists have focused attention on “stratified reproduction” (Colen), “distributed reproduction” (Murphy), and even “disciplining reproduction” (Clarke). Reproduction, it would seem, is in a period if not of academic boom then of new intellectual reflexivity.

If we take a long view of social thought to consider the ways in which social reproduction relies on and exceeds its purely biological form, we might conclude with Franklin that we have been in the “age of reproduction” for a much longer time than the present.
An emphasis on social or ideological reproduction alongside biological reproduction (and sometimes through it) can be traced quite nicely, for instance, through the extensive work of Marxist feminism and its abundant responses to the implicit patriarchalism of concepts like “the totality” and the problem of the capacity of capitalism to sustain itself across generations. The “age of reproduction” is the era not only of new technologies for producing new generations of humans but also, arguably, of the capitalist enterprise, one that has never been able to do without reproducing new generations of labourers. In light of both the rush to coin a new era defined by “reproduction” and the simultaneous fact of reproduction’s long duration, it seems appropriate to recognize “reproduction” as a foundational concept, if not actually a well-established keyword.

The history of the word “reproduction” contains some interesting counterfactuals, however. To modern eyes, it might seem that biological reproduction comes first, followed by social reproduction. Such a progression would seem to follow from conventional understandings of socialization or development: biology creates a tabula rasa on which the terms and conventions of social life come to be inscribed. Such a reading accords with the French and Latin origins of the term, where reproduction (from reproductio) serves as “the action by which living things perpetuate their species” (1690). Yet the earliest uses of the term recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary suggest that the circulation of the term in English is more amorphous. The first definition of the term is more generic—“The action or process of forming, creating, or bringing into existence again”—and the first recorded use of “reproduction” with a specifically biological frame of reference is from 1713. The social understanding of “reproduction,” in other words, predates its biological understanding. Furthermore, new definitions of reproduction (with respect to republishing,
copying, and even regeneration in animals) emerge in tandem with a tension within the definitional evolution of “reproduction.” Perpetuating the species is not equivalent to making replacements or copies, as the compact OED account of the evolution of the term would suggest:

Latin *reproductio* (15th cent.), French *reproduction* action by which living things perpetuate their species (1690), action of reconstructing or recreating (1754), action of replacing industrially the assets which have been consumed (1758 in Quesnay: compare quot. 1991 at sense 1e), natural or artificial means of propagating plants (1762), (in an animal) natural replacement of a lost body part, organ, etc. (1769), action of republishing (1839), copy of a work of art (1839).

What seems clear both from the contemporary deployment of “reproduction” as well as the historical unfolding of the term is that it encapsulates within itself a series of contradictions and facilitates its own definitional spread. Biological reproduction exists alongside social reproduction as well as after it. The child is the result of human actions that perpetuate its species but is not the sole domain of reproduction. The figure of the child is spoken nowhere in this definition but implied everywhere. Likewise, nowhere in the definitional landscape is reproduction defined against its opposite, but non-reproduction haunts the OED definitions implicitly. Without reproduction, assets would not be replaced, species would not be perpetuated, lost body parts could not be restored, and works of art might not be copied. To conceptualize a non-reproductive relationship to childhood, then, is to uncover two different sites of what is axiomatic but unspoken within the field of “reproduction” itself.

**The Ages and Futures of Non-reproduction**

What *is* a non-reproductive relationship to childhood? Allow me the indulgence of making an example of myself. As a childless person, I come to the concept of non-reproduction honestly. I have no children. I have chosen not to have children. This does not mean I have no child relations, however. I am an aunt, a babysitter, a scholar (and therefore a consumer) of culture made by and for children. I also deploy childhood and its cultures strategically in contexts that are inappropriate to it (I use *Peter Pan* to explain concepts to adults). I consider children as abstractions when I think about voting and public policy. I engage in thought experiments that try to imagine what the world looks like for children who lack a normative family life. I wonder frequently about the overlaps between queer reproduction and eugenics projects. I sometimes treat my dog like a child. I think “arrested development” is another way to consider childhood beyond children. I am perplexed by Henry James’s
observation that “[t]he novel is older and so are the young” (249). I do not believe public life should be inherently child friendly or that people have a right to have children. The interests of parents and the interests of children are not the same. Not reproducing does not foreclose one’s relationship to childhood. How we conceptualize what counts as a relationship to childhood is more elastic than it might seem.

Nor is this range of cultural relationships to childhood lost on parents who benefit from the many ways people make relationships with what we might think of as “other people’s children.” In “After Mother’s Day,” Christina Lupton (herself a mother) describes her desire to write about all the ways of tending to the world that are less easily validated than parenting, but which are just as fundamentally necessary for children to flourish. I mean here the writing and inventing and the politics and the activism; the reading and the public speaking and the protesting and the teaching and the filmmaking. These things are done by definition either by those who don’t have kids at home, or by those whose kids are being looked after by other people—by states, grand-parents, friends.

What Lupton gets at here, without naming it as such, is the phenomenon of the extra-parental. There are benefits to stranger sociability for children and for the concept of childhood. Those of us who eschew biological reproduction relate to children—real, imaginary, and conceptual—in a host of ways, some of which are even shared by traditionally reproductive subjects.

It must also be said that not reproducing (biologically) is no more radical a political act than not marrying. The childless and the “child-full” share investments in the problem and interruption of social reproduction, but non-reproduction prompts us at least to expand our thinking about social relationality within and beyond the normative terms of familial relations that govern the ways in which generations of humans interact with one another and in the name of one another. What it means to inhabit the logic of reproduction (social and biological), then, requires living as well with sites of non-reproduction.

Consider, again, Franklin’s coining of the phrase “the age of reproduction.” Such a diagnosis of this new era is rife with contradictions. While she refers to a technological era devoted to new methods for conceiving children, she argues that these methods themselves have the potential to organize new kinship structures. Furthermore, while the goal of these technologies is to facilitate biological reproduction, one of the effects of working with them, especially if, say, IVF does not work immediately, is to decrease (not increase) one’s chances for reproductive success. The process of reproducing can make one more non-reproductive (see Franklin, Biological).
Consider, as well, the statistical paradox of “the age of reproduction.” When it comes specifically to biological reproduction—at least in North America—Western birth rates have been in sharp decline. According to a report on Canadian census data up to 2011, published in the National Post, “44.5% of couples are ‘without children’ compared to 39.2% with children” (O’Connor). Similar numbers are reported in the New York Times for the United States. Kate Bolick, reviewing Meghan Daum’s collection of essays Selfish, Shallow, and Self-Absorbed: Sixteen Writers on the Decision Not to Have Kids, cites a 2012 Center for Disease Control report in the U.S. indicating that “19 percent of American women reach their mid-40s without ever having a child—a figure that has nearly doubled in four decades.” Similarly, in Canada, the birth rate has been in steady decline. According to Bolick, the American report acknowledges that “among women in the 40–44 age bracket—the final reckoning, according to such surveys—22 percent were ‘childless by choice,’ compared with 35 percent who felt they didn’t have any say in the matter.” It is precisely the uncertain meaning and the unpredictable unfoldings of social non-reproduction that make it such a fascinating site of inquiry. If women in their (traditionally designated) child-bearing years are choosing more and more not to have babies (at least in North America), we may be entering the “age of non-reproduction.” Yet what such a declaration might mean is not at all clear.

The fact that people are writing about not having children and garnering great public fascination for such writing suggests that there is something culturally catchy about the phenomenon. It even has its own burgeoning literature. Statistical childlessness finds its narrative realization in testimonials about what it means not to reproduce. I like to call this emergent genre, which consists mostly of creative non-fiction essays, “kidless lit.” The best and most widely circulated example is Daum’s collection of essays reviewed by Bolick. Other important meditations on the phenomenon include Rebecca Solnit’s Harper’s Magazine essay “The Mother of All Questions,” Bolick’s Spinster: Making a Life of One’s Own, and Vivian Gornick’s The Odd Woman and the City. It is no coincidence that this body of writing is produced by and about women more than men (although it must be said that five out of the sixteen essays in the Daum collection were written by men). Nowhere are women more idealized or policed than as mothers, despite our collective failure to provide the social and financial supports necessary to child-rearing. Indeed, that policing in the form of presumptive motherhood extends to women who have not had children. Solnit recalls two conversations, both underwritten by the assumption that women should, in fact, have children: one took place after a public talk she gave about Virginia Woolf when the audience asked whether Woolf should have had children (leading Solnit to declare, finally, “Fuck this shit”); in another interview
with a British man on a book about politics, she reports that, “instead of talking about the products of my mind, [he insisted] we should talk about the fruit of my loins, or the lack thereof.” In both cases, her interlocutors were incredulous in the face of suggestions that books might matter more to women than babies. Moreover, as Solnit says, “I’m not dogmatic about not having kids. I might have had them under other circumstances and been fine—as I am now.” Non-reproduction can be a state inhabited either polemically or with little fanfare. It might be the condition of women who have had abortions, of childless people more generally, and, indeed, of children themselves. In any case, it confronts us with a set of scripts that have been written long before our own interpellation into social life.

In this way, non-reproduction as a biological mode confronts us, in turn, with the problem of social reproduction. It is as a retort to such a consideration of social reproduction that non-reproduction finds itself at the heart of another emergent body of thought: social theories of reproduction and non-reproduction. While the critique of social reproduction has long been a staple of Marxist thought, especially Marxist feminist thought, interest in the term “non-reproduction” is relatively recent. Nina Power outlines “Brief Notes toward a Non-nihilistic Theory of Non-reproduction,” an article that follows “Non-reproductive Futurism: Rancière’s Rational Equality against Edelman’s Body Apolitic.” In the interests of outlining a queer rational politics inspired by a Rancièrean critique of Edelman, Power outlines examples of child relationality that cannot be recuperated fully into either biological or social reproduction per se. Another recent book, Chantal Jaquet’s *Les transclasses ou la non-reproduction*, which is as yet unavailable in English translation, takes the concept even further. Working with the thought of Spinoza and against that of Bourdieu, Jaquet argues that non-reproduction is an affective state defined by a gap, where the social order sidesteps reproduction per se. For Jaquet, non-reproduction is not the
opposite of reproduction: “every non-reproduction is in some sense a reproduction by other means,” according to the blog Unemployed Negativity, which summarizes Jacquet’s insight in the following way: “Reproduction is an imitation of the immediate tastes and desires of one’s family and class, [whereas] non-reproduction, or what Jacquet calls transclass, often involves an imitation at a distance of the tastes and desires of others, a teacher, a friend from a different class, or the mediated images of a different life.” Jacquet’s work invites us to consider reproduction and non-reproduction less as opposites than as cognates or social kin.

The time, then, seems right to push the question further. How might this concept lead us to think differently about childhood? What gaps and affective states emerge as effects of non-reproduction? Under what conditions does childhood produce transclasses? What are the historical precursors of this social mode? Over, without being against, the prevailing conceptual demand that childhood makes on the concept of reproduction (where childhood serves as the very embodiment of reproduction), I want to suggest here that non-reproduction opens up alternative modes of social relations to the child. These relations exceed the norms of social and biological reproduction without refusing them entirely. In so doing, I propose a counterposition to the prevailing if understated importance of reproduction as one condition of possibility for childhood studies, with its apparent opposite: non-reproduction. What is beyond in loco parentis? What remains when we look beyond the family for terms of child relationality? Might there be grounds for considering forms of stranger sociability that do not merely replicate the well-worn tropes of danger and intergenerational perversion? Non-reproduction asks us to think about what it means to relate to children (as actual people and as abstractions) without presuming a familial or reproductive relation to them.

In addition to naming elusive and sometimes diminished social relations that exist frequently alongside familial and reproductive ones (not necessarily in contrast to them), non-reproduction usefully marks a state, an active set of political choices or refusals, and indeed a series of actions (not just inactions): in other words, that web of thought and agency that goes not only into being childless but also into interrupting reproduction without displacing it.

**Theses on the Philosophy of Non-reproduction for Childhood**

What follows are some provocations concerning what it might mean to expose the limits of reproductive thinking in the field of childhood studies and to embrace the paradox of non-reproductive child relationality. What might it mean, in other words, to think of the child as the figuration not of reproduction (or reproductive futurism) but of non-reproduction and to read the child non-reproductively?
(Warning: these theses may contradict one another.)

1. Non-reproduction is the necessary underbelly of reproduction—its putative site of failure or abjection. Until reproduction is complete, non-reproduction threatens its realization. This formulation might seem to reduce to the following statement: the opposite of having children is not having children. Non-reproduction attaches to reproduction, however, like an imaginary but unwelcome friend.

2. The value of the reproductive subject depends implicitly on the social fact (and frequent denigration) of the non-reproductive subject. A ticking biological clock resembles nothing more than the clock inside the crocodile that follows Captain Hook around in Peter Pan, threatening his very existence by reminding him of past tragedy and impending doom.

3. The child of our imaginary is not a biologically reproductive subject. The normative child is the non-reproductive child. The reproductive child is a scandal. Reproduction is the fantasy and the issue (literally) of the adult.

4. Non-reproduction must be seen in both biological and ideological terms, but social and biological non-reproduction are not identical. The desire for social non-reproduction (where raising children is a political act) sometimes can hold in place the fetish of biological reproduction. Consider, for example, the paradox of red diaper babies: utopian offspring contained by the family form.\(^5\)

5. Non-reproduction, as the refusal of reproduction, does not always exist in opposition to reproduction. In fact, reproductive and non-reproductive subjects stand in solidarity with each other all the time.

6. Childlessness is biologically non-reproductive but socially generative.

7. Childlessness opens up the possibility for reading non-reproductively—that is, for reading the child as a stranger who need not be repatriated into modes of familial sociability.

8. Childlessness opens up the possibility of substitute child relations and interspecific kinship.

9. Abortion is a site of non-reproduction, but not absolutely so. (a) Women who are/have been parents do still choose not to reproduce. Like reproduction, non-reproduction has to be chosen over and over again. According to statistics released by the Guttmacher Institution, a think tank dedicated to “advanc[ing] sexual and reproductive health and rights” (“About”), 61% of women who had abortions had already given birth to at least one child (“Abortion”). (b) A feminist politics of abortion forces us to consider the possibility of non-reproductive futurity. As Barbara Johnson shows us, the non-reproductive future of abortion can produce powerful images of child and fetus relationality. Figuration and rhetoric expose to us the impossibilities of our own thought.

10. Non-reproduction opens up new possibilities for relating to the “spoiled” child, that is, a child spoiled by...
social norms, where, for instance, familial structures of child relationality do not or cannot succeed or where the state neglects its duties of care. Under these conditions, it is essential to cultivate non-familial possibilities of child relationality. Stranger sociability becomes not just possible but necessary. Some of these forms of sociability take place within familial norms (including adoption and fostering). Others require that we rehabilitate the concept of the stranger and disentangle it from the danger with which it rhymes too easily.

11. One prehistory of the spoiled child is the history of race and racialization in North America: children disarticulated or stolen from their families (as effects of slavery, of residential schools, of internment, of child sexual abuse, of compulsory able-bodiedness) make political demands for the recognition of non-reproductive relationality. Non-reproduction is sometimes shrouded in traumatic history and needs alternative afterlives.

12. Non-reproduction makes possible alternative temporalities for child relationality that disarticulate childhood from parent-child (or familial) relations: childhood without children (the man-child); the deployment of the concept of childhood in sexual role play; parentified children; idioms for intergenerational relationships; reversals of parent-child relations among adults (when parents are ill or need senior care). What might it mean to consider child relationality in rhetorical terms, beyond the traditional confines of parenthood?

13. Non-reproductive subjects have the potential to read non-parentally: to read the child as a political unit (for voting purposes, for public spending, and so forth), to read the child as a public good without necessarily entering into material relations of care with actual children. Concept children expand life chances for real, historical children.

Non-reproductive Futures of Childhood

It remains to be seen how the concept of non-reproduction might be taken up for the purposes of new scholarly inquiry in our field. My hope would be that such a concept enables us, at the very least, to pursue productively the form and the significance of strangers for childhood and its cultures; that it might position us to revise what counts as parenthood and even, in some cases, to displace parenthood as the primary lens through which we view child-life; that non-reproduction, in Jaquet’s sense, opens up the study of childhood to new conceptualizations of affect; that the concepts and vocabularies of childhood could be tracked for the ways they circulate beyond the bodies and lives of actual children; that kidless lit could be taken as a more capacious object of study with an as yet unwritten history; that the figure of the child could be more and less than it is already.

Then again, perhaps even to propose futures for non-reproductive inquiries into childhood is already to contravene the very potential of the concept.
Notes

1 In overviews of the field of childhood studies, “reproduction” stands as a key term of analysis. In her introduction to *Children in Culture, Revisited: Further Approaches to Childhood*, Karín Lesnik-Oberstein points to Anthony Gidden’s work on social reproduction as essential to understanding the status of childhood as a site of social reproduction that is not reducible to adult ideology. She reads childhood studies and child participation in the social through Gidden’s suggestion that “every act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act of production and as such may initiate change by altering the structure at the same time as it reproduces it” (qtd. in Lesnik-Oberstein 12–13; emphasis added). Mary Jane Kehily takes a slightly different tack in *An Introduction to Childhood Studies* by positioning reproduction as a key vector of analysis for understanding the history of childhood in terms of gender and sexuality: at least since the medieval period in Europe, “appropriate sexuality,” she points out, “was closely tied to ideas about reproduction and marriage” (71; emphasis added). She adds that “[i]t is impossible to understand children’s sexuality without looking at the world views of their culture and without tying discussions to much wider issues of gender roles, reproduction, marriage rules and even cosmology” (78–79; emphasis added).

2 Jack Halberstam worries that Edelman’s so-called anti-social thesis is nihilistic; José Esteban Muñoz and John Brenkman have each taken Edelman to task in different ways for ceding the ground of futurity, particularly for politics of race and class; Steven Bruhm and I have also suggested that Edelman disavows the queerness of childhood that actually opens up when the future is putatively heteronormative.

3 Marxist feminists including Silvia Federici, Selma James, Rosemary Hennessey, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, and more recently Madeline Lane-McKinley and Marija Cetinic have all pointed out that capitalism depends on child-rearing for the reproduction of labour for capital and for social and ideological reproduction within and beyond the domestic sphere. It seems clear that feminisms that foreground the gendered and racialized distribution of often unwaged labour have changed the commodity sphere of child-rearing.

4 This literature has an interesting queer prehistory, too, in essays on bachelors and old maids or what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick calls “Tales of the Avunculate: Queer Tutelage in *The Importance of Being Earnest*” (52–72). In the extensive literature about old maids and bachelors, these characters’ non-reproduction designates queer modes and times of life circumscribed within and by reproductive norms themselves. What distinguishes these texts from the more recent genre of kidless lit, however, is that their characters historically are defined by not being married rather than by not having children, even if the two categories enjoy significant overlap.

5 In an unpublished paper, Marissa Brostoff argues in an analysis of red diaper babies that left melancholy assumes a childish form when Marxists inhabit the contradiction of producing a different political future while coming up against the intractable limits of familial institutions and conventions.
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